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Hoyer: The Religious Peace of Augsburg

The Religious Peace of Augsburg
By THEo. HOYBI

T

his year marks the 400th anniversary of the Religious Peace
of .Augsburg, an event regarded so highly and of such .importance in the history of the Lutheran Reformation that the
100th, 200th, and 300th anniversaries were celebrated throughout
the Lutheran Church in the respective years. Our fatben haft
regarded it as a special intervention of God to save the Refomwioa
from total collapse. In an article sketching the history of this Diet
of .Augsburg one of the early leaders of the Missouri Synod. P. C. D.
Wyneken, calls the adoption of this peace tteaty "the end of the
Reformation, when, after a long sauggle, by God's grace, the most
valuable treasure of the church was attained: freedom" (Lttllmwlm,
September 25, 1855 ). Others, outside our circles, iec:ognize the
importance of this Diet and its resolutions; the ncxed Roman
Catholic historian Karl Brandi speaks of it as "the most important
Diet of the century after Worms," its resolutions "the most perfect
expression of the dawn of a new time." Present-day church historians differ somewhat in their evaluation of the Augsburg Peace;
they seem inclined to s ~ the mistakes made, the incomplereoess,
the indefiniteness of the provisions adopu:d.
brief
.A
enrnio•tion
of the "context" - the background. the needs, the problems confronting the responsible members of the Diet, and the possible
solutions of them -should be of value.
The background, the events leading to the Treaty of Passau.
1552, was discussed in detail in an earlier article (CoNC. THEoL.
MONTHLY, XXIII, 401); hence a brief summary will here suffice
to
the why and the wherefore of the Peace of Augsburg. 1555.
The first uial of Luther and his followers (Worms, 1521) bad
ended in a total conderooation of the Reformation mo,emem;
Luther, already excommunicated, was banned; all loyal citizens
were admooisbed to help enforce the edict against Luther. 'Ibat
it was not actually enforced was due to the fact that me head of
the Empire was kept busy outside Germany by wars against Pmace
and the pirates on the Mediterranean; and within Germany, while
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only a few of the territorial princa had more or less adopted
luther's cause, all of them were greatly incensed against the enemies
of luthcr in Rome; most of them chronically jealous of each other;
not one of them dared an attempt t0 carry out the Edia for fear
of inciting dvil war. Hence, while the Edict was on the program
of the Diets of Niirnberg in 1522 and 1524, nothing was done
about it.

To the first Diet of Speier, 1526, the Emperor had sent an ultimamm: The P.dict of Worms was t0 be enforced; he himself was
coming 10 lead the action. The Lutheran cause had by this time
gained enough supporters that the discussion was prolonged;
a deadlock resulted; but before the Diet adjourned, notice was
brought that the Emperor was no longer so friendly toward Rome;

the Pope had formed an alliance with Prance and both were now
at war against him; instead of coming to Speier, Cllarles was on
the way 10 Rome t0 sack it in 1527. The Diet realized that it was
poor policy to encourage Roman supporters by prosecuting the
reform element. Charles, in fact, sent a letter to that effect to the
Diet, though it arrived to0 late. So the Diet left the matter of
the Edict 10 the individual princes- the beginning of the famous,
later legally established principle of etdtu ,-•gio, mu ,-•ligio-until
a council could be convened to settle the religious controvcnics.

Three years of marvelous growth for the Lutherans ( as they
were now called) followed. By 1529, at the second Diet of Speier,
the now thoroughly alarmed Roman majority of the estates voted
IO .rescind the resolution of 1526 and to enforce the Edict of
Worms; the Lutheran princes protested (hence the name Procesancs) that a resolution adopted nnaoirnnusly in 1526 mu1d not
legally be rescinded by a mere majority; but the protest sent to
the Emperor was cast into the imperial wastebasket and the messengers carrying it int0 prison. The Emperor sacked Rome, diaated
the terms of peace to Prance and the Pope, and prepared for the
next Diet. The outlook was so dark that under the leadership
of Philip of Hesse an attempt was made to unite the Lutherans and
the Swiss reform party, the followers of Zwingli, who were now also
tbreaceoed with war by a union of the Bomaoist cantons with the
archenemy of Switzerland. Austria. But the Colloquy of Marburg

failed in ill purpose.
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The danger to Protestantism was again averted by the westward
progress of the Turk; the Emperor needed the support of the princes
and cities who had adopted the "new faith" against the common
enemy. This accounts for the friendly invitation extended to the
Protestants to present their confession at the Diet of Augsburg,
1530- an attitude that was changed, however, when the Emperor
decreed ( no doubt under the advice of the Papal Legate Campeggio,
whom be met on the way to Augsburg): Six months of grace for
the Lutherans; if they did not return to the "old church" by that
time, force was to be used. But the Turk advanced too rapidly,
and that decree was postponed until a council could decide.
It was evident what the intention of both ecclesiastical and
secular authorities was: The Protestants must be brought back to
the "old church," by persuasion, by pressure, if possible; by force,
if necessary. This is corroborated by the correspondence of
Charles V. To his brother he wrote, as early as 1529, that he
meant to use every persuasion possible to make what compromises
his conscience permitted, to effect a peaceful settlement; but if these
failed, he was determined to crush the Reformation by force. The
anti-Protestant edicts remained Inw; only the execution was delayed
as circumstances made it necessary. From 1521 to 1546 Prorestantism was illegal and existed only because the law could not be
enforced. In addition, at the papal legate Campcggio's instigation,
the Romanist princes of South Germany met in June, 1524, and
formed the League of Regensburg; the princes of North Germany
formed the League of Dessau in 1525, both Leagues in their coostitutions making it their object to enforce the Edict of Worms,
to eradicate Lutheranism. All of this was no secret; ProteSrants
knew what was coming; hence the protective and defensive leagues
of Torgau, 1526, and of Schmalkalden, 1531.
To the credit of Charles it should be emphasized that he aimed
at a peaceful reunion of the church by mutual compromise of both
parties; therefore his insistence throughout these yean on a church
council where all parties should meet and iron out their diHetences.
To be sure, his object was largely political: A united church to
prop up a united empire - an empire that was tottering and needed
powerful support. A typical Hapsburg, he seems to have had no
doubt that he would succeed. But by 1545 he became convinced
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1955
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that all peaceful measures had failed and that the use of force was
indicated. The Pope had finally called a council to meet in Trent;
but by secret intrigues he had nullified the usefulness of the council
for the purpose Charles had in mind; the program of the council
published by the Pope made it impossible for Protestants to attend.
Charles realized that all his endeavors to secure unity in church
and empire by peaceable means had failed; it could only be
accomplished by force. But it was impossible to use force unless
me power of the Schmalkaldic League, which had by this time
become an international organization, could be broken.
How this was done by a skillful, though not very creditable use
of Philip of Hesse's bigamy and appeal to the selfish ambition of
Maurice of Saxony; how the Schmalkaldic League was defeated;
ho\\• the Emperor then tried to force his compromise confession,
the Interim, on the Protestants of Germany and not only failed, but
\\'115 so definitely defeated that in disgust he withdrew from Germany and, in a somewhat limited manner, left the management
of German affairs and especially the settlement of the religious
difficulties to his brother Ferdinand - all this has been sketched
previously ( CTM, loc. cit.). The German princes then gathered at
P35Sau in August, 1552, to discuss the siruation and to decide what
was to be done. They wanted a permanent settlement of the
religious question, not by a council- a council called by the Pope
and directed by him would never do justice to the Protestants - nor
by the Diet, because too many Roman ecclesiastics had a seat in
the Diet-but at a meeting of princes fairly representative of
both sides. To the latter stipulation the Emperor would not give
his consent; he insisted that the Diet should decide; he still counted
on divisions among the Protestants. But the Protestant princes
finally consented. What they wanted was peace- b1s1iintlign,

Pri,J,,

b,htrrrlichn, 1mb1tling11r, /iir tmd fiir ewig wiihr111J,,
so
they described i t - a permanent peace. With this demand, then,
they came before the Diet summoned to Augsburg for November 13, 1554, but not opened until February 5, 1555-old medieval
custom, this! Also medieval precedent for this, that relatively few
members attended the early sessions of the Diet; none of the
Electors came; only two of the great ecclesiastical princes, one of
them, the Cardinal Bishop of Augsburg, the only member of the
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Diet who consistently prorested against the demand for permanent
peace. While the Diet dragged on aimlessly, all the ProteStant
princes met at Nawnburg and there decided that they would stand
firmly by the Augsburg Confession of 1530; and so prepared, they
came to Augsburg.
The Lutheran demands were vehemently opposed by the
Romanist members of the Diet. But they all, except the Omlinal
Bishop of Augsburg, wanted peace. So, finally, the terms of the
Religious Peace of Augsburg were drafted and adopted; the terms
were d1ese (Lindsay's account):
"It was agreed that the Lutheran religion ~ould be legalized
within the Empire, and that all Lutheran princes should have full
security for the practice of their faith; that the medieval episcopal
jurisdiction should cease within their lands; and that they were
to retain all ecclesiastical possessions which had been secularized
before the passing of the Treaty of Passau ( 15 5 2) • Future changes
of faith were to be determined by the principle c11ins r11gio1 11itts
r11ligio [though this term was not used in the Peace]. The secular
territorial ruler might choose between the Romanist or the Lutheran
faith, and his decision was to bind all his subjects. If a subject
professed another religion from his prince, he was to be allowed
ro emigrate without molestation. These provisions were agreed
upon by all and embodied in the recess. Two very important matters remained unsettled. The Romanists demanded that any ecclesiastical prince who changed his faith should thereby forfeit lands
and dignities - the ecclesiastical reservation! This was embodied
in the 'recess,' but the Prorestanrs declared that they would not be
bound by it. On the other hand, the Protestants demanded toleration for all Lutherans living within the territories of Romanist
princes. This was not embodied in the 'recess,' though Ferdinand
promised that he would see it carried out in practice. Such was
the famous Peace of Augsburg."
It was a compromise; that is generally stated, and deplored by
some. Was it wrong? It was not a religious, a confessional com•
promise, but political. 'Ihe question before the Diet of Augsburg
was not primarily unity of church and religion. Of course, all
wanted unity; but by this time everybody also knew that Rome
would allow only Ihm brand of unity. There were certain things
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1955
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that Procatants coNltl not sacrifice, and certain things that
Rome 111011ltl not concede. That was evident before the Diet
convened. The question before the Diet, therefore, was not how
tO establish unity of confession, to unite the two factions; they were
beyond that. Grimm rightly says: "The destruction of medieval
Cluistian unity during the first half of the sixteenth century was
recognized by the Peace of Augsburg. . . . But one cannot lay
the blame for this loss upon the princes at Augsburg, for the break
had become so complete by 1555 that it is difficult to conceive
of any force stt0ng enough to restore unity." The question before
the Diet was one of subsistence, of continued existence; should they
continue to slaughter one another? Their object was not to inBuence
any man's convictions. Brandi speaks of "dem unverkennbaren
Willen der Beteiligten, fort:m miteinander in Frieden zu leben.
Aber freilich dieser Wille war ein erzwungener, zustandegekommen
durch beiderseitige Ermildung". And Droysen: "Nicht nur um
einen 'Religionsfrieden' handelte es sich, sondern . . . um cine
Gcstaltung Deutschlands, welche es den Standen alter und neuer
Konfcssion ... moglich machte, miteinander weiter zu existiereo."
It was a political agreement "to live and let live." Lortz cites the
text of the pact stating the purpose of the agreement: "Der Religionsfriede wurde vereinbart, um die im Reich durch die 'spaltige
Religion' entstandene 'oachdenkliche Unsicherheit aufzuheben,
der Stiinde und Untcrtaneo Gemilter wiederum in Rube und Veruauen gegeneinander zu stelleo, die Teutsch Nation, unser geliebt
Vaterlaod vor endlicher Zertreonung und bevorsrehendem Untergang zu verhilten'.•.. So erreichteo die Augsburger Konfessionsverwaodren und die Katholiken was zu diesen Zeiten moglich war:
einen Kompromiss." It was the best thing the princes could do;
it was right to do it.
One result of Augsburg, which especially German writers deplore,
is this: It put the finishing touch to a definite change in the
Empire; national unity was a thing of the past, even in theory;
the Holy Roman Empire had become a loose federation of territorial ptinccs. Droyseo, e.g., says: "Aller Vorteil fie! den Standen
zu. Die Summe der Neuordoung von 1555 bedeutet den vollen
Sieg der reichsrurstlichen Arisrokratie. • • • Sic triumphierte iiber
das nationale wie iiber das monarchische lnteressc. Das Reich als
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solches war vernichtet, aus einem Jcaiserlichen Reich deutscher
Nation war es ein stiindisches Gemeinwesen deutseher Nation
geworden, eine 'Republik' mit dem Namen des K6nigs oder Kaisen
an der Spitze." .As far as the control of religion was concerned,
the c11i11.s Tegio, citu Teligio was an evil thing; one is tempted to
say with Lortz: "Ein heidnischer Grundsatz war anerkannt.
Es konnte nichts anderes das Ergebnis scin, als dass er das Christennun gewaltig belastete." "The peace," says Lucas, "in subjecting
religion to stnte control, created the idea of state-established religion
which was to remain practically unquestioned until the outbreak
of the French Revolution." However, Grimm points out: "In most
respects the Peace of .Augsburg merely recognized a fail 11cco111pli
in the Empire, namely, the emergence of tcrritorialism." The
beginning and large development of this antedates by far the
Peace of .Augsburg. Lortz rightly calls it "die Be1iegel11ng dcr
deutschen politischen 2.erstiickelung." But Lora, despite his
enormous admissions justifying the Reformation, remains a good
son of the Church! He says: "Am Ende der Regierung Karls V ist
der Territorialismus zum Sieg iiber das Reich gekommen. Aber
es ist unzutrelfend, zu sagen, dass dies durch Karl geschehen sei.
Es geschah vielmehr vorherrschend durch jene Kraft, die das scbon
im .Aufstieg begriffene Territorialfiirstenrum wesentlich in sich
selbstiindig machte ••. durch Luthers Reformation. . . • In diesem
Sinne ist Luther, im Gegensatz zu der von ihm geweckten nationalen
Energie, durch den Ablauf der von ihm inaugurierten Siruatiooen
Zerstorer der dcutschen Reichs-Nation geworden." I.om is, however, honest enough to add: "Es geschah aber nichl "'" durch sie
[die Reformation]."
Lindsay, on the contrary, and rightly, makes Charles V dim:tly
responsible for the loss of German national unity. "There was no
reason why it (the Peace) should not have come years earlier and
without the wild war-storm which preceded it, save the faa that, in
an unfortunate fit of enthusiasm, the Germans had elected the
young King of Spain to be their Emperor. They had chosen the
grandson of the genial Maximilian, believing him to be a tta1
German, and they got a man whose attitude to religion 'was half.
way between the genial orthodoxy of his grandfather Maximilian
and the gloomy fanaticism of his son Philip II' and whose 'mind was
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1955
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always traveling away from the former and towards the latter
position' (Pollard). The longer he lived, the more Spanish he
becune, and the less capable of understanding Germany, either on
iu secular or religious side. His whole public life, so far as that
country was concerned, was one disastrous failure. He succeeded
Ollly when he used his imperial position to increase and consolidate
the territorial possessions of the House of Hapsburg; for the charge
of dismembering the Empire can be brought home to Charles as
effectually as to the most selfish of the princes of Germany." He
poinu out that the Peace of Augsburg was contained in the
decisions of Speier in 1526 and repeated in every one of the truces
which the Emperor made with his Lutheran subjects from 1530
to 1544. "Had any one of these been made permanent, the religious
\\'31', with its outcome in wild an:irchy, in embittered religious
antagonism, and its seed of internecine suife, to be reaped in the
Thirty Ye:irs' War, would never have occurred. But Charles, whose
mission, he fancied, was to preserve the unity 'of the seamless robe
of Christ,' as he phrased it, could only make the attempt by drenching the fields of Germany with blood, and perpetuating and accentuating the religious anrogonisms of the country which had chosen
him for iu Protector."
It should not be overlooked that, without this developing territorialism, humanly speaking, there would have been no Reformation. Mackinnon notes: "It must be remembered that without their
{the Protestant princes'] support the Reformation could hardly
have succeeded in mainroining itself against the Catholic opposition
and the reactionary policy of Charles V. . . . Would there have
been any Reformation at all without their alliance? The fate of
Hus would seem to decide this question. • • . Even Luther would
have been crushed had there been no Elector to hide him in the
Wanburg and no League of Schmalkald to intervene between him
and the Emperor. As it was, the final ueaty saved the work which
Luther had achieved in co-operation with his princely patrons."
Above all, the Religious Peace of Augsburg marks the first step
toward religious toleration and liberty. This is acknowledged by
all, though deplored by some. Bainton, in his characteristic way,
says: 'Those who deplore any breach in unity as scandal and sin
will bemoan the ourcome. Those who prize liberty above univer-
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sality will see here one step in the direction of freedom in religion.•
It should suffice to cite Lindsay's fine summary of the outcome:
"This Religious Peace of Augsburg has been claimed, and rightly,
as a viaory for religious liberty. From one point of view the vicuxy
was not a great one. The only Confession roleratcd was the Augsburg. The Swiss Reformation and its adherents were outside the
scope of the religious peace. What grew t0 be the Reformed or
Calvinistic Church was also outside. It was limited solely to the
Lutheran, or, as it was called. the evangelic:al creed. Nor was theie
much gain to the personal liberty of conscience. It may be said
with truth that there was less freedom of conscience under the
Lutheran territorial system of churches, and also under the Roman
C-itholic Church reorganized under the canons 11Dd decrees of Trent,
than there had been in the medieval Church. The victory lay in
this, that the .first blow had been struck to free mankind from the
fetters of Romanist absolutism; that the first faltering step had
been taken on the road to religious liberty; and the first is valuable
not for what it is in itself, but for what it represents and for what
comes after it. The Religious Peace of .Augsburg did not concede
much according to modern standards; but it contained the potency
and promise of the future. It is always the .first step which counrs."
A word as to the exceptions made in the Peace. The Swiss
Reformation and Calvinism "were outside the scope of religious
peace." It is inexact to say: "They were excluded"; they simply were
not included. We can surmise reasons for this. The Reformation
of Zwingli was a Swiss, not a German movement, represented only
in the south of Germany near the Swiss border. Moreover, the South
German cities had joined the Lutherans in the Wittenberg Coo·
cord. .As to Calvinism, Lindsay uses a significant expression: "What
gretu lo b, the Reformed or Calvinistic Church." There was at
this time ( 1555) very little Calvinism in Germany (see the map
of Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism in Grimm, Th, R1/ormalion Er11, p. 481). The extensive spread of Calvinism in Germany
came later. For some of the things that happened later in the
relationship between Lutherans and Calvinists all that should be
said here is: Even Lutherans sometimes make mistakes! But that
has nothing to do with the Religious Peace of Augsburg. In 1555,
in Germany, Calvinism simply did not come into caosideration.
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1955
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As for the Anabaptists and related radicals, their treaanent and
very common persecution, an explanation ( not an excuse) may
be offered. The bulk of Anabaptists were quiet, inoffensive people;
but they bad too many loud-mouthed leaders who brought the whole

sea into disrepute. They usually were Chiliasts who expected the
immediate return of the Lord to establish His thousand-year kingdom on earth; and their divine obligation was to prepare a center
for that millennium. That brought them into confiict with the
secular governments. Think of the extravagances of Zwickau,
Miinster, Miihlhausen; the plots of Thomas Miinzer, etc. The
result was that in many quarters the sect was suspected of anarchism. In that time of general unrest and dissatisfaction, when
government officials often felt that they were sitting on a powder
keg, this suspicion was enough to make Anabaptists unwelcome
and often led to persecution. An explanation, not an excuse!
The great result of the Peace of Augsburg was just that.
It brought peace to Germany; sixty years of peace, while in the
neighboring countries war mged and devastated land and people,
e.g., in the Netherlands, in Fronce. In its course the Peace brought
other blessings: "It meant the overthrow of the papal power, of
the medieval ecclesiastical domination over soul and conscience,
as far as Lutheran Germany was concerned. It ensured for the
persecuted Protestant, if not religious toleration in the modern
sense, at least the possibility of escaping persecution by removing
from the jurisdiction of a Roman Catholic prince to that of a
Protestant one. It was thus an advance on the medieval alternative
of absolute submission to a universal ecclesiastical authority,
despotically exercised, or death for refusal. This alternative could
be evaded by at least Luther's followers in the Catholic States, and
this represented no small advance on the medieval spirit"
(Mackinnon).
Yes, it was only a tempomry peace; sixty-three years later it
was broken by the Thirty Years' War. But that was not the fault
of the Religious Peace of Augsburg! Parts of the peace treaty,
especially omissions, are generally cited as furnishing an opening
for renewed warfare, and rightly so; but does anyone in these
war-tom times claim that any peace treaty can be formed that
docs not leave a loophole for renewed war? That war was renewed
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol26/iss1/65
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was not the fault of the Augsburg Treaty, but of the Countcrreformation. Militant Romanism, with Jesuits as leaders, or
rather as drivers, broke the treaty and renewed the war. But that
again is another chapter.
Lutherans of 1555 hailed the Religious Peace of .Augsburg as
a great blessing and thanked God for it. .And so should we!
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